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Administrative Law-
COURT LIMITS THE. CHENERY DOCTRINE
OF SCOPE OF REVIEW
The Market Street Railway Co. filed with the SEC an application for
approval of a proposed reorganization plan. The plan included the terms
of an agreement between Market Street Railway Co. and its parent, the
Standard Gas and Electric Co., settling for $550,000 a debt allegedly owed
to Standard Gas, the validity of which had been challenged by certain of
Market Street's shareholders. The agreement further provided for pay-
ment of $50,000 to William J. Cogan, attorney for the shareholders. The
SEC eliminated Cogan's fee on the basis of a conflict of interest created by
conversation with his adversaries.' The district court, pursuant to § 11 (e)
of the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935,2 disapproved the re-
organization plan in so far as it failed to provide an allowance of the fee.
The circuit court reversed, holding that irrespective of the wisdom of the
Commission's action the district court could only set aside the determina-
tion where it amounted to an abuse of discretion. On rehearing the circuit
court reversed its former decision, stating that the issue of attorney-client
relationship was one in which the expertise of the court justified substitu-
tion of judgment, and in so doing affirmed the district court's finding of
no conflict of interest. SEC v. Cogan, 201 F.2d 78, rev'd on rehearing, 201
F.2d 82 (9th Cir. '1952).
The scope of review accorded administrative determinations depends
in large measure upon two criteria: the intent of Congress, and the com-
parative qualifications of the agency and the court.3 Where the statute
under which the agency is operating evidences an intent on the part of the
legislature to limit the scope of review, 4 or where it is determined that the
1. Instant case at 82. The conflict of interest was predicated upon a conversation
between Cogan and his adversaries (officers of Standard Gas) during the course of
settlement negotiations. Cogan said, "'In case you don't want me as counsel against
you on any other matter, perhaps you could give me a retainer."
2. Section 11(e) of the Act provides: ". . . the Commission, at the request of
the company, may apply to a court, in accordance with the provisions of subsection
(f) of section 79r of this title, to enforce and carry out the terms and provisions of
such plan. If . . . the court . . . shall approve such plan as fair and equitable
• . .the court as a court of equity may . . . take exclusive jurisdiction and pos-
session of the company or companies and the assets thereof, wherever located; and
the court shall have jurisdiction to appoint a trustee . . . to hold or administer,
under the direction of the court and in accordance with the plan theretofore approved
by the court and the Commission, the assets so possessed." 15 U.S.C. § 79k(e) (1946).
3. See Davis, Scope of Review of Federal Administrative Action, 50 COL. L. Rv.
559, 581 et seq. (1950).
4. Gray v. Powell, 314 U.S. 402 (1941) ; NLRB v. Hearst Publications, 322 U.S.
111 (1944).
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agency because of its experience and technical skill is better qualified than
the court to handle a particular issue 5 courts normally will not substitute
their own judgment. Section 11(e) of the instant statute provides that
the agency shall determine if a proposed reorganization plan is "fair and
equitable." 6 In defining the scope of review under this same section the
Supreme Court in SEC v. Chenery Corp.7 used both criteria to decide that
an agency determination could be set aside only where it amounted to an
abuse of discretion. The Court stated that "the very breadth of the statu-
tory language" evidenced a legislative intent to limit the scope of review; 8
it further justified the limited review on the grounds of comparative quali-
fications, stating that the agency was better qualified to set standards and
to judge whether a conflict of interest resulted from the purchase by
officers and directors of stock in their corporation while it was being re-
organized.0 Cases subsequent to Chenery, however, have evidenced a re-
treat from the Court's declaration that the legislature intended this area be
subjected to a limited review. In the case of In re Engineers Public Serv-
ice Co.10 the third circuit had before it the problem of whether a corpora-
tion's simplification plan providing for repurchase of preferred stocks at
their voluntary liquidation or call prices was fair and equitable. After an
extensive examination of the legislative history of the Public Utility Hold-
ing Company Act 11 the court concluded that under Section 11 (e) it could
"exercise its independent plenary judgment as an equity reorganization
tribunal upon every matter relating to the fairness and equity of the re-
organization." 12 The Supreme Court, after granting certiorari, asserted
that the circuit court erred in interpreting the statute to allow unlimited
substitution of judgment; but nevertheless, also limited the Chenery deci-
sion to its determination that scope of review is dependent on comparative
qualifications, and on this basis substituted its own judgment.'3 The
instant decision is thus consistent with the retreat from Chenery's inter-
pretation of legislative intent.
5. E.g., Dobson v. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 489, 498 (1943) ; United States v.
Louisville & Nashville R.R1, 235 U.S. 314, 320 (1914). The nature of the limited
scope of review is an examination of the agency's findings to determine if it is reason-
able and has a rational basis in law. See Gray v. Powell, 314 U.S. 402 (1941);
NLRB v. Standard Oil Co., 138 F.2d 885 (2d Cir. 1943).
6. Section 11(e) provides: "In accordance with such rules and regulations or
order as the Commission may deem necessary . . . any registered holding company
may . . . submit a plan to the Commission for the divestment of control.
securities, or other assets, or for other action by such company. . . . If, after notice
and opportunity for hearing, the Commission shall find such plan . . . fair and
equitable . . . the Commission shall make an order approving such plan.
15 U.S.C. §79k(e) (1946).
7. 332 U.S. 194 (1947).
8. Id. at 208.
9. Id. at 209.
10. 168 F.2d 722 (3d Cir. 1948).
11. See note 2 supra.
12. In re Engineers Public Service Co., 168 F.2d 722, 736 (3d Cir. 1948).
13. SEC v. Central-Illinois Corp., 338 U.S. 96 (1949) rever.ing sub norn. In re
Engineers Public Service Co., supra note 12. The Court establishes its superior
qualifications on the basis of experience gained in the case of Otis & Co. v. SEC, 323
1953]
1070 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 101
This court in addition limits the Chenery case determination that
agency expertise should control the question of conflict of interest. Assum-
ing the Chenery decision to be correct 14 there is a distinction between the
two cases on the basis of the factual situations involved. The problem in
Chenery, of discerning whether the possession by corporate management
of stock in its corporation during a reorganization period creates a conflict
of interests, requires a knowledge of the intricacies of corporate reorganiza-
tion ascribable to the agency working constantly with these problems.' 5
However, no such technical background is required in order to determine
if an attorney in a settlement agreement is acting in the best interests of
his client.16 The Court in Chenery makes the agency's superior experi-
ence with the particular problem the basis for limiting review,17 but the
courts have had considerable experience with problems of the attorney-
client relationship in a context similar to the instant case. In Berner v.
Equitable Office Bldg. Corp.,'8 which involved a corporate reorganization
under the Bankruptcy Act,' 9 the court decided that an attorney had
breached his fiduciary relationship by giving to a third person information
about the value of trust property which was not made available to his
client. Again in Silbiger v. Prudence Bonds Corp.,20 also a reorganization
under the Bankruptcy Act, the court determined that an attorney's fees
should be cut because he represented opposing interests. This experience
justifies substitution of judgment in the instant case. The Commission
contends that it is setting up a new standard for attorney-client relations
under the Chenery doctrine and therefore its judgment should prevail.
The courts in establishing a conflict of interests have usually required
a finding that an attorney has acted for one whose interests are opposed to
his client's in the same matter.2 ' Thus where an attorney represented two
opposing classes of bondholders,2 or where an attorney gave information
to a relative and prospective purchaser about the value of stock possessed
by his client without revealing this information to his client,2 a conflict has
been found to exist. Also where an attorney and his wife purchased stock
U.S. 624 (1945), a case dealing with a similar simplification problem. Interestingly
enough, the Otis case preceded Chenery and also arose under Section 11 (e) of the
Public Utility Holding Company Act. However, the Court nowhere espouses the
position that the legislature intended this area to be left to agency judgment and sub-
stitutes its own judgment.
14. Chenery has been denominated the most extreme example of judicial hands-
off in the area of comparative qualifications. See Davis, suzpra note 3 at 577, 583.
15. The intricacies of corporate reorganization are illustrated in SEC v. Chenery
Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 206 (1947).
16. Cf. Davis, supra note 3 at 583 (areas in which court is clearly expert).
17. 332 U.S. 194, 209 (1947).
18. 175 F.2d 218 (2d Cir. 1949).
19. 52 STAT. 883 (1938), 11 U.S.C. §501 et seq. (1946).
20. 180 F.2d 917 (2d Cir. 1950).
21. Murphy v. Riggs, 238 Mich. 151, 213 N.W. 110 (1927).
22. Silbiger v. Prudence Bonds Corp., 180 F.2d 917 (2d Cir. 1950) (even under
these circumstances attorneys' fees were not completely disallowed).
23. Berner v. Equitable Office Bldg. Corp., 175 F.2d 218 (2d Cir. 1949). See
also Woods v. City National Bank and Trust Co., 312 U.S. 262 (1941).
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in a company having claims against his client he was deemed to have
conflicting interests.2 4 However, no precedent has been found for estab-
lishing a conflict of interest on the basis, as in the instant case, of a chance,
unaccepted offer to an adversary. Since the Commission advanced no rea-
son for a higher standard, there is little justification for refusing to follow
these judicial precedents.
Anti-trust--
RIGHT OF FORMER SHAREHOLDER TO
SUE AFTER SALE OF STOCK
Plaintiff, an owner of one-third of the shares in a corporation which
he knew had been forced out of business by the competing defendant cor-
poration through a conspiracy in restraint of trade, sold his shares to the
defendant at a fraction of what the shares would have been worth under
normal business conditions. Plaintiff's suit for treble damages under the
Sherman Act 1 was dismissed by the district court. On appeal the dis-
missal was affirmed on the ground that the injury caused by the conspiracy
was to the corporation, not the plaintiff; therefore, any redress was to be
had through the corporation. The sale Qf the stock was merely a substitu-
tion of money for the previously injured property of the corporation and
resulted in no further injury to the plaintiff. Peter v. Western Newspaper
Union, 200 F.2d 867 (5th Cir. 1953).
The instant decision appears to be consonant with the well-established
doctrine that injuries to corporations and their property are to be redressed
only by the corporation.2 The disadvantages that result from permitting
stockholders individually to bring suits to remedy wrongs against their
corporations are: a multiplicity of suits, the difficulty in ascertaining the
damages done to each stockholder, the probability of multiple damages for
the same injury and the possibility that claims of creditors of the corpora-
tion would be ignored. The courts express this doctrine by labelling the
injury to the corporation as "direct" and to the stockholder as "conse-
quential" and allowing recovery only for "direct" injuries.3 "Direct"
injuries are usually held to be those where the injury is against plaintiff
stockholder alone and does not affect all the other stockholders. 4 Under the
24. In re Midland United Co., 159 F.2d 340 (3d Cir. 1947).
1. "Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of any-
thing forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue . . . and shall recover threefold the
damages by him sustained. . .. " 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1946).
2. 13 FmrcHER, CYCLOPEDI A OF CORPORATIOIS § 5911 et seq. (1932) ; BALLANTINE,
CoRPoRAnioNs § 143 (Rev. ed. 1946) ; Glenn, The Stockholder's Sidt-Corporate and
Indvidual Grievances, 33 YAiE LJ. 580 (1924).
3. Smith v. Hurd, 12 Metc. 371, 385 (Mass. 1847) ; Coronado Development Co.
v. Millikin, 22 N.Y.S.2d 670, 175 Misc. 1 (Sup. Ct. 1940); and cases cited in note
5 infra.
4. BALLANTiNE, CORpORATiONs § 143 et seq. (Rev. ed. 1946).
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anti-trust laws the courts have adopted this concept of general corpora-
tion law, 5 perhaps because they feel that the practical difficulties mentioned
above sufficiently outweigh the policies of the civil treble damages (to in-
crease the number of enforcement agencies and further to deter violations
of the anti-trust laws). 6 However, the use of labels has caused courts to
deny relief even where none of the practical difficulties appear to have been
present, such as where there was only one stockholder in the corporation
and no mention of any creditors.7 Relief has also been denied to a stock-
holder where the injury caused by the forbidden practices would seem to
be clearly "direct" such as the loss of his salary and corporate office.
8
The instant case appears to be the first under the anti-trust laws in
which relief was sought by the stockholder after he had sold his stock.
Here the factors behind the "direct-consequential" dichotomy seem to be
inapplicable. Had recovery been allowed, the potential multiplicity of suits
would further the policy of the Sherman Act to increase the number of
enforcement agencies and to deter violations. The damages claimed were
the difference between what was received for the stock and what it would
have been worth absent the prohibited practices which caused the drop in
value. A computatiofn of these damages so as to eliminate the remaining
objections to allowing recovery by the stockholder is suggested by General
Rubber Co. v. Benedict.9 By this formula the corporate assets are ascer-
tained and the compensatory damages (as distinguished from anti-trust
treble damages) recoverable by the corporation from the monopolist are
included. Then the corporate liabilities are deducted and the difference is
divided by the number of shares of stock. This resulting amount is the
value of the stock. The damages would be treble the difference between
this value and the amount received in the stockholder's sale. The fact that
the plaintiff is no longer a stockholder is not a valid reason for denying
recovery; for he, and not the present owner is the one entitled to recover
under the Federal Rules.'0 -
5. Loeb v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 Fed. 704 (3d Cir. 1910); Ames v. American
T. & T. Co., 166 Fed. 820 (C.C.D. Mass. 1909); Westmoreland Asbestos Co. v.
Johns-Manville Corp., 30 F. Supp. 389 (S.D.N.Y. 1939) ; Seaboard Terminals Corp.
v. Standard Oil Co., 15 F. Supp. 1085 (S.D.N.Y. 1936); Gerli v. Silk Ass'n of
America, 36 F.2d 959 (S.D.N.Y. 1929).
6. See Maltz v. Sax, 134 F.2d 2, 4 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 319 U.S. 772
(1943) ; Weinberg v. Sinclair Refining Co., 48 F. Supp. 203, 205 (E.D.N.Y. 1942)';
Johnson v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 33 F. Supp. 176 (E.D. Tenn. 1940), aff'd
mein., 123 F.2d 1016 (6th Cir. 1941). For evidence of the increasing success of this
plan see Comment, 61 Y n L.J. 1010 (1952).
7. Westmoreland Asbestos Co. v. Johns-Manville Corp., note 5 mrpra; Seaboard
Terminals Corp. v. Standard Oil Co., note 5 sapra; green v. Victor Talking Machine
Co., 24 F.2d 378 (2d Cir. 1928).
8. Gerli v. Silk Ass'n of America, note 5 supra.
9. 215 N.Y. 18, 109 N.E. 96 (1915), discussed in SmVNs, CoRPoRAxIONrs 790
(2d ed. 1949). The lost profits of the firm would also be included in determining
the damages. Frey & Son v. Welch Grape Juice Co., 240 Fed. 114 (4th Cir. 1917).
10. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b) ; Goldboss v. Reimann, 55 F. Supp. 811 (S.D.N.Y.
1943), aff'd inem., 143 F.2d 594 (2d Cir. 1944) (only holder of stock at time of
injury may sue).
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On the other hand, the effect of the instant decision is to force a stock-
holder to retain his stock, and if the corporation refuses to sue, to bring
a derivative suit." The use of this device in treble damage actions under
the anti-trust laws was not approved until Fanchon v. Paramount Pic-
tures 12 was decided after the instant case. That decision and the Federal
Rules 13 removed the objection 14 to combining an equitable device, the
stockholders derivative suit, with legal damages under the anti-trust stat-
utes. These derivative suits may be used to remedy situations where the
corporation refuses to sue, as in the instant case, in which the defendant
obtained control over the injured corporation. All stockholders have a
right to intervene in these suits (as does the corporation) ; the decision is
res judicata in a subsequent suit by another stockholder; and the corpora-
tion, not the stockholders, recovers the damages. 15 Thus the danger of a
multiplicity of suits would be avoided; and by forcing the stockholder to
retain his stock, the policy of the Sherman Act, to increase competition,
would be aided. The corporation would still be independent; the damages
recovered would help restore the corporation to a better business position;
and an injunction could be obtained in the same suit to prevent the offender
from continuing the offending acts.' Thus, if the stockholder, as in the
instant case, knew of the monopolistic practices being used against his cor-
poration, he would have a remedy; but the position of the person who, not
knowing of these practices, sells his stock at a price which has been lowered
because of monopolistic practices against his corporation is an unenviable
one. Having failed out of ignorance to sue while he owned the stock, he
discovers he has been damaged by the prohibited acts; but under the instant
decision he is not allowed to bring an individual suit. Allowing the stock-
holder to recover in such a case is analogous to cases, not in the anti-trust
field, in which recovery has been allowed by ex-stockholders of injured cor-
porations where there were no present stockholders in a position to main-
tain the action,17 or where the stockholder had been fraudulently induced
to part with his stock by the defendant,' 8 or where the corporation was no
11. BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS § 143 et seq. (Rev. ed. 1946); 13 FLETCHER,
CcI.OPEDIA OF CORPORATIONS, § 5907 et seq. (1931). See FED. R. CiV. P. 23(b).
12. CCH TRADE REG. REP. (9th ed.) 1167, 452 (2d Cir. 1953), reversing 107
F. Supp. 532 (S.D.N.Y. 1952). See Comment, 52 CoL. L. REv. 1069 (1952), for a
criticism of the lower court decision. Contra, Kalmanash v. Smith, 291 N.Y. 142,
51 N.E.2d 681 (1943).
13. FED. R. Civ. P. 2.
14. Fleitman v. Welsbach Street Lighting Co., 240 U.S. 27 (1916); Meyer v.
Kansas City So. Ry., 84 F.2d 411 (2d Cir. 1936).
15. See note 11 s=pra.
16. Bowles v. National Erie Corp., 3 F.R.D. 469 (W.D. Pa. 1944) (claim for
treble damages under Emergency Price Control Act may be joined with request
for injunctive relief against further violations). See FED. R. Civ. P. 18.
17. Hammer v. Werner, 239 App. Div. 38, 265 N.Y. Supp. 172 (2d Dep't 1933).
See also Sutter v.-General Petroleum Corp., 28 Cal.2d 525, 170 P.2d 898 (1946).
18. Goodliffe v. Colonial Corp., 107 Utah 488, 155 P.2d 177 (1945). In this case
as part of the relief requested and held proper to be granted in the same suit where
damages were also requested, plaintiffs asked to be restored to their position as
stockholders. This type of relief would aid in the furthering of the policy of the
Sherman Act. See text at note 16 supra.
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longer in existence and it was possible to arrange for an equitable distribu-
tion of the damages. 19 Therefore, an exception to the instant rule denying an
ex-stockholder the right to sue made on the basis of lack of knowledge would
seem to be justified.
Criminal Law-
DOUBLE JEOPARDY-MISTRIAL WHEN STATE'S
WITNESSES PLEAD SELF-INCRIMINATION
IS NOT DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS
At trial for assault sheriff's testimony of accomplices' confession, if
believed, was sufficient to find petitioner guilty. Accomplices, who intended
to appeal their conviction in a separate trial, were called by the state but
were excused upon pleading their privilege against self-incrimination.
Prosecution then obtained a mistrial on grounds of the necessity of their
testimony. Seventeen months later on retrial with the testimony of ac-
complices, whose conviction had been affirmed, plea of double jeopardy
under the constitutions of North Carolina I and the United States 2 was
overruled and petitioner convicted. The state appellate courts affirmed.
On certiorari the Supreme Court held that discretion to declare a mistrial
rests in the trial judge; its exercise here did not violate due process.
3
Brock v. North Carolina, 344 U.S. 424 (1953).
Although some form of protection against double jeopardy exists in
all jurisdictions,4 differences occur as to when in the course of trial jeopardy
attaches 5 and as to what situations constitute the "necessity" exceptions
which justify overruling a plea even after jeopardy has once attached.6
The inability of the prosecution to continue because of the absence of its
witnesses has been held not to be such an exception in federal courts,
7
but these decisions have been cast in doubt by refusal of the Supreme Court
19. Weinert v. Kinkel, 296 N.Y. 151, 71 N.E.2d 445 (1947).
1. N.C. CoNsT. Art. 1, § 17.
2. U.S. CoNST. AMENDS. V, XIV.
3. Chief Justice Vinson and Justice Douglas dissented.
4. U.S. CONST. AMEND. V; all state constitutions except the states of Conn.,
Md., Mass., N.C., and Vt., which have included it by common law. See dissent in
instant case by Chief Justice Vinson.
5. Federal courts generally hold that jeopardy attaches when any evidence is
heard. Clawans v. Rives, 104 F.2d 240 (D.C. Cir. 1939); United States v. Kraut,
2 F. Supp. 16 (S.D.N.Y. 1932). The states generally hold either that impanelling
and swearing of the jury is sufficient, Bell v. State, 44 Ala. 393 (1870) ; O'Donnell
v. People, 224 IIl. 218, 79 N.E. 639 (1906), or agree with federal cases, Paul v.
Benzie, 163 Mich. 543, 128 N.W. 739 (1910) ; but some require a jury verdict,
Anderson v. State, 86 Md. 479, 38 Atl. 937 (1897) ; Roberts v. State, 72 Miss. 728,
18 So. 481 (1895) ; see Note, 24 MINN. L. REv. 522 (1940).
6. See Himmelfarb v. United States, 175 F.2d 924, 932 (9th Cir. 1949) (excep-
tions listed) ; note 14 infra.
7. Cornero v. United States, 48 F.2d 69 (9th Cir. 1931); United States v.
Watson, 28 Fed. Cas. 499, No. 16,651 (D.C.S.D.N.Y. 1868). Contra: United States
v. Coolidge, 25 Fed. Cas. 622, No. 14,858 (C.C.D. Mass. 1815).
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to find double jeopardy.in a second court-martial where advancing front
lines made distance to witnesses' homes so great as to prevent them from
appearing in the first trial.8 Of the states which have dealt with the prob-
lem, roughly half deny a second trial where the jury has been sworn and
prosecution has failed adequately to prepare its case,
9 while the others seem
willing to grant a new trial.10 From the Court's earlier approval in Palko
v. Connecticut 1 of appeals by the state in criminal cases, the majority
in the present case finds it no great extension under the "fundamental
notions of fairness" 12 test of due process 13 to permit a retrial where state's
evidence is delayed. In reiterating the rule of discretion in the trial judge,
14
the Court has encouraged leniency in granting mistrials to prosecutors who
are unwittingly unprepared.
The instant case is analogous to Palko insofar as both involve the
question of further state action against defendant under the due process
clause; but appeal by the state grants a right similar to that enjoyed by
the defendant,' 5 whereas in the instant case it is dubious whether peti-
tioner, if surprised by a change in testimony, has a mutual right to a mis-
trial or a seventeen month continuance. 18 Although denial of a contin-
uance to secure absent witnesses has been held error where defendant has
used reasonable effort to obtain them and there is probability that they can be
obtained later,' 7 surprise at testimony of witnesses will not enable defendant
to obtain a new trial where, as in the instant case, reasonable diligence would
8. Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684 (1949). Justice Black for the majority found
the rule of the Cornero case, note 7 supra, too "rigid."
9. Allen v. State, 52 Fla. 1, 41 So. 593 (1906); Commonwealth v. Payne, 245
S.W.2d 581 (Ky. 1952); People v. Barrett, 2 Caines 304 (N.Y. 1805); State v.
Richardson, 47 S.C. 166, 25 S.E. 220 (1896); Pizano v. State, 20 Tex. App. 139
(1886) ; State v. Little, 120 W. Va. 213, 197 S.E. 626 (1938). See Mount v. State,
14 Ohio Rep. 295, 305 (1846); State v. Nelson, 7 Ala. 610, 614 (1845).
10. State v. Parker, 66 Iowa 586, 24 N.W. 225 (1885); State v. Dove, 222
N.C. 162, 22 S.E.2d 231 (1942) (except in capital cases) ; Savell v. State, 150 Ala.
97, 43 So. 201 (1907) senible; accord, Commonwealth v. Simpson, 310 Pa. 380, 165
Atl. 498 (1933) (except in capital cases); State v. Campeau, 52 Vt. 313 (1880).
11. 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
12. See Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 607 (1948) (concurring opinion of Justice
Frankfurter).
13. See Woon, Du PRocEss OF LAW 252 (1951).
14. Discretion for manifest necessity has allowed retrial in United States v.
Perez, 9 Wheat. 579 (U.S. 1824) (hung jury); Simmons v. United States, 142 U.S.
148 (1891) (juror's acquaintance with accused); Lovato v. New Mexico, 242 U.S.
199 (1916) (irregularity in indictment) ; Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684 (1949) (wit-
nesses absent for tactical military reasons) ; United States v. Potash, 118 F.2d 54
(2d Cir. 1941) (ill juror). But cf. United States v. Whitlow, 21 U.S.L. WEEK
2444 (D.D.C. March 6, 1953) (misconduct of defense counsel does not warrant mis-
trial).
15. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 328 (1937). See dissent in instant case
at 432; Miller, Appeals by the State it; Criminal Cases, 36 YALE L.J. 486, 508
et seq. (1927).
16. Graves v. State, 65 Tex. Cr. App. 419, 144 S.W. 961 (1912) held that the
remedy for defendant's surprise is not a new trial but a continuance.
17. Benge v. Commonwealth, 298 Ky. 562, 183 S.W.2d 631 (1944); Lacks v.
Commonwealth, 182 Va. 318, 28 S.E.2d 713 (1944).
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have prevented it.8 Furthermore, the Palko case allowed appeal for error
by the court whereas the instant case presents the question of the state
taking advantage of its own error.
Even if the prosecutor did not know that his witnesses would refuse
to testify '9 and even though the witnesses were essential to his case,20 his
failure to ascertain their readiness beforehand subjected the petitioner to
needless harassment 2 ' and both parties to the loss of fresh evidence.
22
A reversal in the instant case would cause prosecutors to prepare their
cases more carefully and would deny them the opportunity to secure a new
jury when they feel the case going against them.
Federal Jurisdiction-
ACTION BASED ON GEORGIA LAW FOR
INJURIES IN CEDED AREA PRESENTS
FEDERAL QUESTION
Alleging personal injuries as the result of the negligence of the de-
fendants within the confines of Fort McPherson, Georgia, plaintiff brought
suit in a federal district court to recover damages. Both parties were
Georgia citizens. The suit was dismissed for lack of federal jurisdiction,
upon the ground that the action did not arise under the laws of the United
States within the meaning of § 1331 of the Judicial Code.' On appeal, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed and re-
manded, holding that the Georgia law became operative as federal law when
18. State v. Henson, 290 Mo. 238, 234 S.W. 832 (1921) (defendant's own
witnesses) ; Acton v. State, 104 Tex. Cr. App. 75, 282 S.W. 805 (1926) (denial of
continuance for surprise at state's witnesses; State v. Mooradian, 152 Wash.
37, 231 Pac. 24 (1924).
19. Petitioner claimed prosecutor knew before he called the case for trial.
[Brief for Petitioner, p. 7]. Respondent claimed there was no evidence of such
knowledge. [Brief for Respondent, p. 5].
20. The testimony of the accomplices probably appeared essential to the prosecutor
and judge. DeSpite the fact that the accomplices were convicted on the same evi-
dence, their confessions are not as strong against Brock as against themselves. The
memory of the sheriff, prosecution's only witness linking defendant to the shooting,
was shaken by defense counsel [Record, p. 10], and the Supreme Court of North
Carolina divided on the admissibility of his evidence as to the confession of the
accomplices. State v. Brock, 234 N.C. 392, 67 S.E.2d 282 (1951).
21. See concurring opinion of Justice Frankfurter in instant case at 428; dissent-
ing opinion of Justice Murphy in Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 692 (1949);
United States v. Shoemaker, 27 Fed. Cas. 1067, 1068-1069, No. 16,279 (C.C.D. Ill.
1840).
22. See Wade v. Hunter, 72 F. Supp. 755, 757-8 n.2 (D. Kan. 1947).
1. "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions wherein
the matter . . . arises under the . . . laws of the United States." 36 STAT. 1091
(1911), as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1946).
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this area was ceded by Georgia to the United States. Mater v. Holley,
200 F.2d 123 (5th Cir. 1952).2
It is well settled that the civil law of a state respecting private rights
which is in effect at the time territory is purchased or ceded for federal
purposes remains in force until abrogated by Congress.3 Actions arising in
the ceded areas have ordinarily been brought in the state courts,4 in part
because of the uncertainty of federal jurisdiction. The court in the instant
case reasoned that since Art. I, sec. 8, cl. 17 of the United States Constitu-
tion granted the federal government "exclusive" legislative authority over
the ceded territory, any law operating within such area must derive its
authority from the United States. Therefore, the action was one which
arose under the laws of the United States, and the district court had
jurisdiction.
Since 1875 the "federal question" statute 5 has incorporated the "arising
under" language contained in Article III of the Constitution. Although
there is some early authority that this similarity in language manifests a
congressional intent to confer upon the federal trial courts the full range
of constitutional power over such cases, 6 the courts, after some vacillation,7
have finally construed the statute as conferring jurisdiction only where the
plaintiff's cause of action is founded directly upon federal law.8 For
example, in Gully v. First National Bank,9 the Supreme Court held there
was no federal jurisdiction of a suit by a state tax collector against a
national bank for unpaid taxes, despite the fact that the imposition of such
a tax would have been unlawful in the absence of a permissive federal
statute, While upon first impression the Gully case would appear to pre-
clude the result attained by the instant court, the cases are distinguishable
in one notable respect. The federal statute in the Gully case within its
permission left the states full legislative power over the state tax laws,
2. For cases upholding such jurisdiction see: Jewell v. Cleveland Wrecking Co.
of Cincinnati, 28 F. Supp. 366 (W.D. Mo. 1939); Coffman v. Cleveland Wrecking
Co. of Cincinnati, 24 F. Supp. 581 (W.D. Mo. 1938); Steele v. Halligan, 229 Fed.
1011 (W.D. Wash. 1916). Contra: Misner v. Cleveland Wrecking Co. of Cincinnati,
25 F. Supp. 763 (W.D. Mo. 1938).
3. Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry. v. McGlinn, 114 U.S. 542 (1885); American Insurance
Co. v. Canter, 1 Pet. 511 (U.S. 1828).
4. See, e.g., James Stewart and Co. v. Sadrakula, 309 U.S. 94 (1940); Ohio
River Contract Co. v. Gordon, 244 U.S. 68 (1917). The right to serve process in the
ceded area is generally reserved by the ceding state. See Note, 101 U. oF PA. L. REv.
124 (1952).
5. 18 STAT. 470 (1875).
6. "This bill gives precisely the power which the Constitution confers-nothing
more, nothing less." Statement by Matthew H. Carpenter, 2 CONG. REc. 4986 (1874).
See Bergman, Reappraisal of Federal Question Jurisdiction, 46 MIcH. L. REv. 17, 27
(1947) ; Forrester, The Nature of a "Federal Question," 16 TuLANE L. REv. 362, 374
(1942). Article III of the Constitution has been broadly interpreted to include any
case that might involve a federal issue. See Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 9
Wheat. 738 (U.S. 1824).
7. See Chadbourn and Levin, Original Jurisdiction of Federal Questions, 90 U. op
PA. L. REv. 639 (1942).
8. E.g., Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667 (1950); Puerto
Rico v. Russel and Co., 288 U.S. 476 (1933).
9. 299 U.S. 109 (1926).
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But, when territory is ceded to the federal government those state laws
operative in the area at the time of the cession remain in force despite sub-
sequent repeal 10 or the adoption of new laws "- by the state. From this it
might forcibly be argued that, since the ceding state has relinquished all
future legislative control in favor of the federal government, the laws opera-
tive in the ceded area could aptly be described as laws of the United States.
However, since in almost all instances the state courts would be most
familiar with the application of both repealed and subsisting state law, such
a conclusion seems undesirable. If the accepted policy is that federal ques-
tion jurisdiction should obtain only where it fulfills the function of vin-
dicating substantial federal rights,12 the present question may better be left
to the state courts.
International Law-
FAILURE TO APPLY RETROACTIVITY
TO EXTRATERRITORIAL ACTS
Shortly after it lost control of the Chinese mainland,' the Nationalist
government sold to plaintiff's predecessor in title forty aircraft lying in
the British colony of Hong Kong and owned by the Central Air Transport
Corporation, an unincorporated Nationalist government agency. At the
time of sale, certain C.A.T.C. employees who had defected to the Com-
munists exercised a degree of control over the aircraft.2  Subsequently, the
Communists were accorded de jure recognition by the British, and the
Reds claimed that because of their control at the time of sale, the principle of
retroactivity operated to give them title to the planes. Plaintiff sought a
declaration by the Hong Kong Supreme Court that the aircraft in question
were its property. The court held that the aircraft belonged to the Com-
munists, de jure recognition having retroactively conferred ownership of
the assets of C.A.T.C. on the Communist Government from the date of de
10. McCarthy v. R. G. Packard Co., 105 App. Div. 436, 94 N.Y. Supp. 203 (1905).
11. United States v. Paul, 6 Pet. 141 (U.S. 1832).
12. See Mishkin, The Federal "Question" in the District Courts, 53 COL. L. REv.
157, 159 (1953); Wechsler, Federal Jurisdiction and Revision of the Judicial Code,
13 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 216, 225 (1948).
1. The Nationalist government moved to Formosa on December 9, 1949, while
the sale of the aircraft in question took place on December 12, 1949. The revolutionary
People's Government had proclaimed itself the government of China on October 1,
1949, and was accorded de jure recognition by the British government at midnight on
January 5, 1950 "of those parts of the territory of the Republic of China over which
it had established effective control and if control was established after Oct. 1, 1949, as
from the dates when it so established control." Instant case at 741.
2. After special guards engaged by Nationalist employees were removed under
the orders of the Hong Kong commissioner of police, the defecting ex-employees took
physical control of the aircraft. A later injunction secured by the Nationalists to
prohibit this interference was disregarded and "the physical control of the aeroplanes
by these ex-employees for the time being continued." Instant case at 739.
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facto Red control.3 On appeal the Privy Council reversed, ruling that the
Communists could show no title superior to the Nationalists' at the time
of sale, nor could they now rely upon any rights arising out of actual pos-
session gained by the defecting employees' interference with C.A.T.C. prop-
erty, such interference being illegal under the controlling law of Hong
Kong.4 The ordinary princple of continuity of a state's rights and obliga-
tions s was not displaced by any consideration of retroactivity. Civil Air
Transport Inc. v. Central Air Transport Corporation, [1952] 2 All E.R.
733.
Along with the increased use in the last half-century of recognition as
a political weapon 6 came the practical judicial problem of the effect to be
given acts of a government with an international existence in fact, which
existence was denied by the political fiction of non-recognition. The im-
practicality of ignoring a fait accompli of an unrecognized de facto govern-
ment is often avoided in cases where the de facto state has become recog-
nized between the commission of the act and the time of suit, by the ap-
plication of the principle that recognition retroactively validates acts of a
government from the time it acquired de facto control.7 While the doctrine
of retroactivity clearly is accepted by British and American courts,8 its
limits and utility are less apparent.9 By limiting the application of retro-
3. This date was the same as that on which the Communists declared themselves
the lawful government of China (Oct. 1, 1949). The sale of the aircraft took place
over two months later (Dec. 12, 1949).
The Hong Kong court also held the sale void because not in the best interests of
the people of China. The Privy Council dismissed this theory on the grounds that
it was not for Her Majesty's Courts to pronounce that a foreign government was
acting contrary to the best interests of its people.
4. The illegality lay in the ex-employees' violation of the restraining order of the
Hong Kong Supreme Court enjoining such interference, and in the violation of a
Hong Kong ordinance prohibiting anyone from functioning in Hong Kong on behalf
of a foreign power without the consent of the governor. Instant case at 745.
5. "Changes in the government . . . of a state do not, as a rule, affect its posi-
tion in international law . . . the nation remains, with rights and obligations un-
impaired. . . . The state is bound by engagements entered into by governments
that have ceased to exist; the restored government is generally liable for acts of the
usurper." 1 MOORE, DIGEsT OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 249 (1906). Cf. Boguslawski
v. Gdynia Amerkya Linie, [1950] 2 All E.R. 355 (C.A.).
6. This is especially true of the United States. In 1848 James Buchanan could
write, "In its intercourse with foreign nations the Government of the United States
has, from its origin, always recognized de facto governments." 1 MooRE, ,DIGEST OF
INTERNATIONAL LAw 124 (1906). The policy of the United States in setting up
international responsibility as a prerequisite for recognition of Latin American govern-
ments and the refusal of Britain and the United States to recognize the Soviet gov-
ernment until 1921 and 1933, respectively, illustrate the change in approach.
7. The principle has been applied whether recognition was de jure, Oetjen v.
Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297 (1918); Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250
(1897) ; or de facto, Luther v. Sagor, [1921] 3 K.B. 532, 543.
8. Dickinson, Recognition Cases 1925-30, 25 Am. J. INT'L L. 214, 235 (1931).
9. The American rule appears to be that retroactivity is not applicable to extra-
territorial acts.. See Lehigh Valley R.R. v. State of Russia, 21 F.2d 396, 401 (2d
Cir. 1927). The holding in United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942), giving "retro-
active" effect to a Soviet decree confiscating assets of Russian corporations, including
assets of branches in this country, might eliminate this limitation. But the case may
be read to hold that an executive agreement to give such effect to the decrees will
override state law on the matter. For a more complete articulation of this view, see
Stevenson, Effect of Recognition on the Applicatio; of Private Internatiottal Law
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activity to acts of a de facto government affecting property over which it
has acquired lawful possession according to the local authority, the instant
court precludes application of retroactivity to any extraterritorial acts.10
If possession must be gained lawfully, there is no way a de facto govern-
ment can gain control of assets of the de jure government within the juris-
diction of another sovereign. Any outright seizure of such assets must be
considered a theft if the old government is not to be deprived of the pro-
tection of the laws of the jurisdiction in which those assets are located. A
taking of possession on behalf of the de facto government by persons who
formerly had possession of those assets on behalf of the de Jure govern-
ment 1 must also be illegal, for those persons are vested merely with pos-
session. A switch in their allegiance cannot strip the de jure government
of its title.
An analysis resting on the effective lawful control of the property
in question should be sufficient to determine the effect to be given acts of a
de facto government. In the present state of authority, only with respect
to the acts of an insurrectionary government which has not yet acquired
complete de facto control must concepts of retroactivity supplant an analysis
resting only on effective control at the time of the act. The acts of such
a government within its territory are ordinarily of no legal effect,'12 but
where the question of their validity has arisen after the insurrectionary has
acquired de facto control and been accorded de jure recognition, the acts
have been held valid ab initio.' 3 It would be clear that this retroactive
effect is due more to the fact that complete control has subsequently been
Norms, 51 COL. L. REV. 710, 719 (1951). It is not clear that this rule has been
accepted before by Great Britain.
A further limitation on retroactivity is that it does not generally invalidate other-
wise valid acts of the old government-a necessary limitation if de jure recognition is
to have any lasting value. Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, 304 U.S. 126 (1938) ;
Boguslavski v. Gdynia Ameryka Linie, [1950] 2 All E.R. 355, 363-6 (C.A.). The
boundaries of this limitation may also be unclear because of the initial problem of
determining whether the act in question by the old government was valid in the first
place. This is illustrated in the instant case at 744 where, although the act of sale
was here held valid, the court mentioned the possibility of such a disposal being invalid
if it were made by a despot on the eve of fall with the purpose of absconding with the
proceeds.
10. As to the problem of retroactivity's operating extra-territorially, the court
itself said at 745: "It might be too wide a proposition to say that the retroactive effect
of de jure recognition must in all cases be limited to acts done in territory of the
government so recognised, for the case of a ship of the former government taken
possession of by insurgents on the high seas and brought into a port which is under
the control of the de facto government would Iave to be considered. . . ."
11. For example, the defecting C.A.T.C. employees in the instant case.
12. Janson's Case, 3 MooRE, INTERNATIONAL AiTRATIONS 2902 (1898); Jarvis'
Case, RALSTON, VENEZUELAN ARBiTRATioNs OF 1903 145 (1904). But cf. United
States on behalf of Hopkins v. Mexico, General Claims Commission, 1926, Opinions
of Commissioners 42 (1927) (recognizing the continuity of government despite the
ascendency of an insurrectionist administration, and enforcing against the succeeding
legitimate administration a postal money order sold during the illegal administration).
Perhaps this distinction rests, in part, on the failure of the insurrectionists to penetrate
all the government so that the control of the former regime continued as to ministerial
acts, but not as to political acts.
13. Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250 (1897) ; Oetjen v. Central Leather Co.,
supra note 7.
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acquired rather than to foreign recognition, were it not for the refusal of
some courts to recognize the validity of acts performed by an unrecognized
government in de facto control.1 4 Although the more recent authority is to
the contrary,15 there is yet no authority for invoking the doctrine of retro-
activity upon acquisition by an insurrectionary of complete de facto control
rather than upon political recognition. However, an examination of the
reasons underlying the doctrine of retroactivity as presently espoused sug-
gests that acquisition of de facto control, albeit unrecognized, should serve
as well to "validate" acts of the insurrectionist.
The basic reason for the doctrine of retroactivity is that the effect to be
given acts within a territory depends upon the laws of that territory, and
since the recognized government will recognize the validity of its own acts,
comity requires that other governments do the same. 16 The effective gov-
ernment of a territory is the law thereof. 17 There is no reason and ordi-
narily no practical means by which to deny that government the right to
decide the validity of its own acts within its own territory.' 8 Thus, ulti-
mately, the effect to be given acts of a government within a given territory
depends not upon whether that government has been accorded de jure
recognition, but upon whether that government has the control necessary
to enforce its acts.' 9 Control, not recognition, confers the right to govern.2°
In the final analysis, "[de jure] recognition 'validates' nothing." 21
There is little merit in the argument that recognition by a court of the
existence of this de facto control would usurp the prerogatives of the execu-
tive. 22  The incidents concomitant with political recognition do not ac-
14. Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic v. Cibrario, 235 N.Y. 255, 139
N.E. 259 (1923).
15. Salimoff & Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 262 N.Y. 220, 186 N.E. 679 (1933);
Wulfsohn v. Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic, 234 N.Y. 372, 138 N.E.
24 (1923) ; Sokaloff v. National City Bank, 199 N.Y. Supp. 355, 120 Misc. 252 (Sup.
Ct. 1922).
16. Cf. Remington v. Samana Bay Co., 140 Mass. 494 (1886).
17. Salimoff & Co. v. Standard Oil Co., supra note 15; Lemkuhl v. Kock, Trans-
vaal L.R. [1903] T.S. 451; United States v. Insurance Companies, 22 Wall. 99 (U.S.
1874) ; cf. American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909) ; Banco De
Bilbao v. Rey, [1938] 2 All E.R. 253.
18. See Borchard, The Unrecognized Government in American Courts, 26 Am.
J. INT'L L. 261 (1932) ; Fraenkel, The .uristic Status of Foreign States, Their Prop-
erty and Their Acts, 25 COL. L. REv. 544 (1925) ; Connick, Effect of Soviet Decrees
in American Courts, 34 YAI.E L.J. 499 (1925) ; Dickinson, The Unrecognized Govern-
ment or State In English and American Law, 22 MicH. L. REv. 29, 118 (1924).
19. "'[A] government there exists, clothed with power to enforce its authority
within its own territory . . . capable of performing the duties and fulfilling the
obligations of an independent power and able to enforce its claims by military
force. .. .' The legitimate conclusion is that the existing government cannot be
ignored. .. ." Salimoff & Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 262 N.Y. 220, 228, 186 N.E.
679, 683 (1933) (quoting from Russian Reinsurance Co. v. Stoddard, 240 N.Y. 149,
157, 147 N.E. 703, 705 (1925).
20. Wulfsohn v. Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic, supra note 15.
21. Moore, Fifty Years of International Law, 50 HARv. L. Rav. 395, 431 (1936).
See also, Nisot, Is The Recognition of A Government Retroactive?, 21 CAN. B. REv.
627 (1943) ; Jones, The Retroactive Effect of Recognition of States and Governments.
16 Barr. Y.B. INT'L L. 42 (1935).
22. But this argument was sustained in Luther v. Sagor, [1921] 1 K.B. 456.
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company judicial recognition of de facto control.2 The de facto govern-
ment does not acquire standing to sue in its own behalf,24 nor does it acquire
the other normal benefits of political recognition, such as the right to
diplomatic representation. Whether or not a government is in de facto
control is usually quite obvious by the time that fact becomes an issue in
litigation,2 5 and courts have decided more delicate questions of international
law.26 If a court feels that to give effect to internal acts of a de facto
government would decrease the effectiveness of the political policy which
dictates non-recognition,2 7 or a doubt exists as to whether effective de facto
control has been established, the question may be referred to the execu-
tive, 2 8 or the case continued until the situation has clarified.29 But to deny
23. Jones, supra note 21, at 50.
24. Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic v. Cibrario, 235 N.Y. 255, 139
N.E. 259 (1923).
25. See e.g., Salimoff & Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 262 N.Y. 220, 226, 186
N.E. 679, 682 (1933) (". . . what is Soviet Russia? . . . We all know that it is a
government. The State Department knows it . . . and the man on the street.
."); Wulfsohn v. Russian S.F.S.R., 234 N.Y. 372, 375, 138 N.E. 24, 25 (1923)
(". .. recognition does not create the state.").
26. Dickinson, supra note 18, at 39, cites these examples of questions decided
by the courts, the decisions of which may prove embarassing to the executive:
cases involving neutral rights, cases involving treaty interpretation, cases involving
sovereign immunity.
27. See Latvian State Cargo & Passenger S.S. Line v. McGrath, 188 F.2d 1000
(D.C. Cir. 1951) in which an executive policy of hostility to the decrees of the un-
recognized Soviet government of Latvia dictated a refusal to recognize the validity
of acts of that government.
28. As was done in the instant case. The reply from the Foreign Office (Feb.
11, 1950) read as follows: "1. His Majesty's government . . . do not recognise
the nationalist government . . . as de jure government of the Republic of China.
2. Up to and including midnight of Jan. 5/6, 1950, His Majesty's government rec-
ognised the nationalist government as being de jure government of the Republic of
China . . . . 3. As from midnight of Jan. 5/6, 1950, His Majesty's government
recognised the Central People's Government as de jure government of the Republic
of China. 4. His Majesty's government recognise that the nationalist government has
ceased to be the de facto government of . . . China. . . . 5. His Majesty's gov-
ernment do not recognise any government other than the Central People's Government
as the de facto government. . . . 6. In 1943 Formosa was part of the ter-
ritory of the Japanese Empire and His Majesty's government consider that Formosa
is still de jure part of that territory. . . ." Instant case at 740-1. The New York
court in the Salimoff case, supra note 15, relied upon similar inforimation from the
State Department with respect to the status of the Soviet government: "'2. The De-
partment of State is cognizant of that fact that the Soviet regime is exercising control
and power in territory of the former Russian Empire and the Department of State has
no disposition to ignore that fact. 3. The refusal of the Government of the United
States to accord recognition to the Soviet regime is not based on the ground that
that regime does not exercise control and authority in the territory of the former
Russian Empire, but on other facts."' Salimoff & Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 262 N.Y.
220, 224, 186 N.E. 679, 681 (1933).
For an example of an executive communication less enlightening as to the policy
the court should follow, see Luther v. Sagor, supra note 22.
29. As was done in Bank of China v. Wells Fargo Bank & Union Trust Co., 92
F. Supp. 920, 924 (N.D. Cal. 1950) where a suit was instituted by representatives
of the Chinese Communist government, which claimed to be the majority stockholder
in the Bank of China, to recover funds on deposit with defendant. A second group,
representing Nationalist officials, contested the claim. The court held, "A Court can-
not justly rule whiIe a controversy is raging, except to maintain the status quo. ...
In the field of international relations, the story must be complete, the facts must be
all in, before the judicial function may be properly exercised .... Therefore the trial
of this cause will be continued sine die."
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that a government exercising internal control is governing is to give fictions
an air of reality they do not deserve.
In any event, the laws of a de facto government will normally not be
given extraterritorial effect until that government is accepted as a member
of the international community.8 0 Therefore, concession of the power of a
de facto government to govern internally is not inconsistent with political
refusal to recognize,31 and has the advantage of protecting private interests
and promoting trade. Since the question-begging limitations on the doc-
trine of retroactivity as now applied are as apt to confuse as to promote
a sensible result, the basic analysis of the instant case resting on effective
control is to be recommended.
Judgments-
INTERLOCUTORY REVIEW FOR GRANTING
NEW TRIAL AFTER STATUTORY PERIOD
Plaintiff had a verdict in a federal district court, but the trial judge
on his own initiative and after the ten day period for such action had
elapsed I ordered a new trial unless plaintiff filed a remittitur of his verdict
in excess of $15,000. The judge further stated on the record that under
no circumstances would he permit a verdict in excess of that amount to
stand. Plaintiff filed a petition for a writ of certiorari to review the order.
The writ was granted, the order vacated and the original verdict rein-
stated by the circuit court. While an order for a new trial is interlocutory
and appealable only from final judgment, the circuit court held that the
use of the extraordinary writ to review it was justified by the excess of
jurisdiction caused by exceeding the ten day limit, and the possibility of
frustration of appellate review raised by the trial judge's statement.
Ka uatser v. Chrysler Corp., 199 F.2d 610 (10th Cir. 1952), cert. denied,
73 S. Ct. 388 (1953).
The federal final judgment rule,2 in an attempt to accomplish its
avowed purposes of speeding litigation at the trial level and avoiding the
clogging of appellate court dockets, often causes hardship to a party who
30. Petrogradsky M.K. Bank v. National City Bank, 253 N.Y. 23, 170 N.E. 479
(1930) ; First Russian Insurance Co. v. Beha, 240 N.Y. 601, 148 N.E. 722 (1925).
31. One school of thought claims that if a state fulfills the conditions of state-
hood, as required by international law, other states are under a duty to recognize it.
They are not, it is said, entitled to serve exclusively the interests of their national
policy regardless of the principles of international law. Recognition is declaratory
of an existing fact. See Lauterpacht, Recognition of States in International Law,
53 YALE L.J. 385 (1944).
1. FED. R. CIv. P. 59(d). "Not later than 10 days after entry of judgment the
court of its own initiative may order a new trial for any reason for which it might
have granted a new trial on motion of a party and in the order shall specify the
grounds therefor."
2. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (Supp. 1952).
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is unable to appeal an order because of its lack of finality.' As a conse-
quence, appellate courts have been induced to grant relief in appropriate
cases by way of the common law writs of certiorari, mandamus and pro-
hibition 4 under the authority of the federal "all writs" statute, which pro-
vides that ". . . all courts established by Act of Congress may issue all
writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and
agreeable to the principles and usages of law." 5 Despite the fact that the
forerunner of this statute appears in the Judiciary Act of 1789,6 the question
of when a petition for a writ should be entertained is still much litigated.
Even since the leading case of Ex parte Peru.7 decided in 1943, the
Supreme Court has considered the question on several occasions.8 Prior to
these decisions, there had been confusion as to whether the power of a court
to issue the common law writs was confined within definite limits 9 or was
so broad as to make their issuance in effect a matter of discretion. 10 Cases
adopting a theory of limited power had reached the result that writs could
be issued only to review a ruling which would defeat appellate jurisdiction"
and in cases where the lower court order was otherwise unreviewable.'
2
Furthermore, a writ usually would not be granted where a remedy by
normal appellate process was available.13 In Ex parte Peru, the Supreme
Court, on the other hand, chose to follow cases allowing mandamus even
in the presence of another remedy and stated that the writs were to be
granted or withheld in the sound discretion of the court. Several months
later in Roche v. Evaporated Milk Ass'n,1" the Court reimposed the former
limitations on power, but this time as mere guides to discretion. 15 Mr.
3. For a critical discussion of the final judgment rule, see Crick, The Final
JTudgment as a Basis for Appeal, 41 YALE L.J. 539 (1932).
4. Of the common law writs issued from a superior court to an inferior court,
certiorari commands the latter to send up the record of a case for review and is
used to keep the lower court within its jurisdiction. White v. White, 70 R.I. 48,
36 A.2d 661 (1944). Mandamus issues to compel perfoirmance of a ministerial duty.
People ex rel. O'Kelley v. Allman, 382 Ill. 156, 46 N.E.2d 974 (1943). Prohibition
is a preventive remedy issuing to restrain further action on a cause below. State
ex rel. Smith v. Williams, 310 Mo. 267, 275 S.W. 534 (1925).
5. 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (Supp. 1952).
6. 1 STAT. 81 (1789); see Ex parte Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 582 (1943).
7. 318 U.S. 578 (1943).
8. Ex parte Fahey, 332 U.S. 258 (1947) ; De Beers v. United States, 325 U.S.
212 (1945); U.S. Alkali Export Ass'n v. United States, 325 U.S. 196 (1945);
Roche v. Evaporated Milk Ass'n, 319 U.S. 21 (1943).
9. Ex parte Harding, 219 U.S. 363 (1911) ; Ex parte Roe, 234 U.S. 70 (1914) ;
It re Atlantic City R.R., 164 U.S. 633 (1897).
10. Ex parte United States, 287 U.S. 241, 248-9 (1932).
11. McClellan v. Carland, 217 U.S. 268, 280 (1910).
12. Stratton v. St. L. & S.W. Ry., 282 U.S. 10 (1930); Maryland v. Soper,
270 U.S. 9 (1926); Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313 (1879). But see, In re Massa-
chusetts, 197 U.S. 482, 488 (1905) ; It re Glaser, 198 U.S. 171, 173 (1905).
13. Ex .parte Harding, 219 U.S. 363 (1911); Ex parte Park Square Auto Sta-
tion, 244 U.S. 412 (1917).
14. 319 U.S. 21 (1943).
15. In U.S. Alkali Export Ass'n v. United States, 325 U.S. 196 (1945) and
De Beers v. United States, 325 U.S. 212 (1945), considerations relating to mandamus
and prohibition were extended to common law certiorari. In both cases, the Su-
preme Court issued the writ though remedy by appeal was also available.
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justice Jackson has formulated a general caution in use of the writs: "As
extraordinary remedies, they are reserved for really extraordinary
causes." 16 Some circuit courts, however, continue to claim a lack of power
to issue the writs except in aid of existing or potential appellate jurisdic-
tion or unless the lower court was exceeding its jurisdiction.17 The instant
court implies that it, too, deems itself so limited.
Cases in which the petition for a writ has been granted have resulted in
what might be called situational standards according to which the court's
discretion will usually be exercised. Writs have been issued where the
ruling below would prevent the litigant from ever reaching the appellate
court 1 8 and where, though the case might go to final judgment, serious
harm to a party could not be corrected on appeal. 19 Issuance of a writ has
also been used as a device to correct manifest error where the court finds
an overriding public policy present, e.g., to grant a party his right to a jury
trial rather than one in equity " and to prevent vitiation of a basic Con-
gressional policy.2 ' On the other hand, it is clear that the possibility of
subjecting the petitioner to a needless trial, even in a criminal case,2 3 is,
in itself, insufficient justification to cause issuance of a writ; 24 for this is
merely an anticipated incident of the final judgment rule. Likewise, orders
causing temporary extra-trial hardships on petitioners have not been deemed
sufficient to invoke a writ.2 5 Refusals to entertain a writ in the above cases
16. Ex parte Fahey, 332 U.S. 258, 260 (1947).
17. United States v. Bondy, 171 F.2d 642 (2d Cir. 1948) (no- power to issue
writ since United States had no right of appeal even from final judgment) ; Southern
Pacific Co. v. United States District Court, 190 F.2d 735 (9th Cir. 1951) (order
granting new trial not reviewable since it was merely "error" and not an excess of
jurisdiction).
18. United States v. Hall, 145 F.2d 781 (9th Cir. 1944) ; Petition of Henneman,
137 F.2d 627 (1st Cir. 1943); Beiersdorf & Co. v. McGohey, 187 F.2d 14 (2d Cir.
1951).
19. De Beers v. United States, 325 U.S. 212 (1945) (to compel vacation of
order enjoining foreign defendant from removing any property from the United
States).
20. Canister Co. v. Leahy, 191 F.2d 255 (3d Cir. 1951); Bereslavsky v. Caffey,
161 F.2d 499 (2d Cir. 1947) (review of denial of plaintiff's motion for jury trial on
his amended complaint after defendant had answered original complaint sounding in
equity); cf. it re Chappell, 201 F.2d 343 (1st Cir. 1953) (no review of denial of
a motion to remove to non-jury calendar).
21. U.S. Alkali Export Ass'n v. United States, 325 U.S. 196 (1945) (to compel
district court to grant defendant's motion to dismiss anti-trust prosecution where the
statutory scheme provided that the FTC should first investigate such cases and make
recommendation to the offender which he could follow and thus avoid indictment);
Ex parte Peru, 318 U.S. 578 (1943) (to compel district court to grant immunity
from process to a libelled ship which the State Department had recognized as belong-
ing to the Republic of Peru).
22. U.S. Alkali Export Ass'n v. United States, 325 U.S. 196 (1945).
23. Roche v. Evaporated Milk Ass'n, 319 U.S. 21 (1943) (petition for writ to
compel hearing on plea to quash anti-trust indictment because of grand jury ir-
regularities not entertained).
24. Sound Investment & Realty Co. v. Harper, 178 F.2d 274 (8th Cir. 1949)
(petition for writ to compel dismissal for lack of jurisdictional amount not enter-
tained).
25. Ex parte Fahey, 332 U.S. 258 (1947) (Court refused to entertain petition
for writ to prevent payment of $50,000 in attorney's fees allowed to lawyers for
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have usually been couched in terms of the general principles limiting the
exercise of the power of the court before Ex parte Peru.26  In forum non
conveniens cases, 27 the second circuit has held that it would not review a
transfer order since the order would be reviewable on appeal in the circuit
to which the case had been transfered.28 The same court exercised its
power to review a transfer order upon a finding that the ruling below
contravened the intention of Congress by ordering transfer to a district
where the defendant would not have been originally subject to service.
29
The same distinction has been drawn by the eighth and ninth circuits in
regard to an order transferring a case from one district to another within
the same circuit3 Thus, a writ has been issued to prevent unauthorized
action of the district court where the merits of the order below are "'so
plain' that we 'ought not hesitate to intervene . . .'" 31 At the same time
there has been no wavering from the general principle that the extra-
ordinary writs will not be used as a device for piecemeal appeals.
32
The court in the instant case allows review of a type order the non-
appealability of which is usually held to be one of the incidents of the final
judgment rule.33 It finds the necessary extraordinary circumstance in a
danger which, as the dissent points out,3 4 is largely problematical. Never-
theless the court hews to the doctrinal limitations on its power by finding
an excess of jurisdiction and a possible frustration of its appellate juris-
diction. The flexibility required for the most effective use of the extra-
ordinary writs, however, can best be maintained by recognizing that relief
is governed by the discretion of the appellate court. To further this end,
the limited power language used by the circuit courts should be replaced
by a clearer statement of the factors to aid the courts in the exercise of
loan association while appeal was pending in circuit court in fight to oust conserva-
tor) ; Benioff v. McCulloch, 133 F.2d 900 (9th Cir. 1943) (petition for writ to
vacate order directing petitioner to pay opponent's travel and counsel expenses in
deposition proceeding not entertained).
26. United States v. Bondy, 171 F.2d 642 (2d Cir. 1948). In In re Chappell,
201 F.2d 343 (1st Cir. 1953), Chief Judge Magruder in refusing to entertain a peti-
tion to review the denial of a motion to remove a case to the non-jury calendar,
pointed to REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF A SPECIAL CO ITTEE OF THE JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, MARCH 20-21, 1952, p. 7, rejecting a proposed
amendment to 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (Supp. 1952) which would allow interlocutory ap-
peals at the discretion of the court, as evidence that the court does not now possess
discretion under the "all writs" statute.
27. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (Supp. 1952).
28. Magnetic Engineering & Mfg. Co. v. Dings Mfg. Co., 178 F.2d 866 (2d Cir.
1950).
29. Foster-Milburn Co. v. Knight, 181 F.2d 949 (2d Cir. 1950).
30. Compare Carr v. Donohoe, 21 U.S.L. WEzx 2382 (8th Cir. Feb. 3, 1953)
with Shapiro v. Bonanza Hotel Co., 185 F.2d 777 (9th Cir. 1950).
31. Foster-Milburn Co. v. Knight, 181 F.2d 949, 951 (2d Cir. 1950).
32. Carr v. Donohoe, 21 U.S.L. WEEEK 2382 (8th Cir. Feb. 3, 1953).
33. Frank Mercantile Corp. v. Prudential Ins. Co., 115 F.2d 496 (3d Cir. 1940);
Libby, McNeil & Libby v. Malmskold, 115 F.2d 786 (9th Cir. 1940).
34. Instant case at pp. 620, 621. A new trial might well result in a verdict of
less than $15,000 or a verdict for defendant; a new jury might sit at the trial or the
same judge might be persuaded by a second verdict in excess of $15,000 to abandon
his position.
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their discretion. As the Roche case indicated, the previous limitations on
the power of the court to issue the writs are still relevant but in a less con-
fining manner as guides to discretion. So interpreted, the difference will
be more than semantic.3 5 Such a recognition by the circuit courts of the
applicable Supreme Court decisions establishing discretion to issue the
extraordinary writs, would not be a means of evading the final judgment
rule,30 but would alleviate hardship in unusual cases.
Trust,-
POWER OF LEGISLATURE TO AUTHORIZE
DEVIATIONS IN TERMS OF A TRUST
Trustees sued for specific performance of a contract for the sale of land
conveyed by William Penn as a charitable trust for use as a "common"
by the inhabitants of New Castle, Delaware. The deed expressly forbade
sale by the trustees, who were later incorporated, and added as a condition
subsequent that the land should revert to the grantor or his heirs if it were
sold.' In 1885 the Delaware legislature passed a special act 2 granting these
corporate trustees the right to sell the trust land subject to the limitation
that the money received was to be held on the same trusts as the land.
The Supreme Court of Delaware held that the act of 1885 was within the
power of the legislature and did not violate either the contract clause of
the federal Constitution 3 or the doctrine of separation of powers.4 Trts-
tees of New Castle Common v. Gordy, 93 A.2d 509 (Del. 1952).
The existence of the long-exercised power of the courts of equity to
alter the terms of established trusts 5 probably has been the reason why little
35. See Wolfson, Extraordinary Writs in the Supreme Ccurt Since ex parte
Peru, 51 Cor. L. REV. 977 (1951). While the power and discretion distinction
might appear to be largely semantic, it could have an effect on the outcome of a
case since under a power concept, even if unusual circumstances were present, the
court would be precluded from entertaining the writ by the limitation on its power.
36. For proposals to amend the final judgment rule, see Note, The Final .udg-
inent Ride in the Federal Courts, 47 Co. L. REv. 239 (1947), and Crick, The Final
Jiudgment as a Basis for Appeal, 47 YALE L.J. 539 (1932). The former suggests
that the order in the instant case should be appealable as of right at the interlocutory
stage.
1. The court makes no mention of the heirs' interest, apparently feeling that since
the settlor's paramount intent that the land should not be sold must be ignored because
of the legislative determination, his subordinate intent that his heirs take upon viola-
tion of the prohibition against sale must also be ignored.
2. Del. Laws 1885, c. 575, p. 848.
3. U.S. CozNsT. Art. I, § 10.
4. The court expressly overruled Tharp v. Fleming, 1 Houst. 580 (Del. 1858)
(a holding without citation of authority that the legislature lacked power to authorize
sale where the trust instrument only permitted rental) on the theory that the doctrine
of separation of powers had not been strictly enforced in Delaware (citing In re
Opinions of the Justices, 88 A2d 128, 138 (Del. 1952)), and therefore this doctrine,
if it were the basis of the Tharp decision, could no longer support that holding.
5. E.g., Price v. Long, 87 N.J. Eq. 578, 101 Atl. 195 (Ch. 1917) ; Matter of
Pulitzer, 139 Misc. 575, 249 N.Y. Supp. 87 (Surr. Ct. 1931), aff'd mem., 237 App. Div.
808, 260 N.Y. Supp. 975 (1st Dep't 1932) ; Weld v. Weld, 23 R.I. 311, 50 At. 490
(1901) ; 2 Scowr, TRUSTS § 167 (1939) ; 3 ScoTT, TRUSTS § 381 (1939).
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litigation has arisen over the question of whether the legislature also has
such power. It has been held that this legislative power of alteration exists
to authorize change in the form of the trust res,6 transfer of the res to a
municipality,7 or sale where expressly forbidden,8 as long as the trust
purpose is not altered. On the other hand, the legislature has been held
to lack the power to change the methods of administration of a charitable
trust 9 or the method of selecting the trustees,10 or to authorize the executive
to change the number of trustees 11 or to terminate a charitable trust.
2
In two of these latter cases the court found impairment of a much clearer
contract than existed here.' 3 Closely analogous to the equity court's power
to alter the terms of a trust is its power of judicial cy pres to change the
purposes for which a trust will be administered when they are or become
illegal or impossible.' 4 At common law, a concurrent doctrine of preroga-
tive cy pres existed as the basis of the Crown's power to alter the purposes
of a charitable trust.15 One American authority indicates that although
there are statements in the cases that the legislature has succeeded to this
power, he believes that this is not the actual status of the law. 8
The changes made by the legislature in the instant trust did not alter
the purposes of the trust and thus do not come within the conjectural
6. Delaware Land & Development Co. v. First and Central Presbyterian Church,
16 Del. Ch. 410, 147 Ati. 165 (Sup. Ct. 1929).
7. Hewitt v. Camden County, 7 N.J. Misc. 528, 146 Atl. 881 (Cir. Ct. 1929).
'8. E.g., Stanley v. Colt, 72 U.S. 119 (1866) ; Crawford v. Nies, 220 Mass. 61,
107 N.E. 382 (1914) ; Old South Society v. Crocker, 119 Mass. 1, 20 Am. St. Rep.
299 (1875) ; Sohier v. Trinity Church, 109 Mass. 1 (1871) ; Petition of Van Horne, 18
R-I. 389, 28 Atl. 341, (1893).. But cf. Bridgeport Public Library v. Burroughs Home,
85 Conn. 309, 82 Atl. 582 (1912).
The basic case for the proposition is apparently Stanley v. Colt, 72 U.S. 119, 169
(1866), where the Court stated, without citation of authority, that the legislature
had exercised the power to authorize sale, when expressly forbidden, for some 200
years. The argument of the successful party, id. at 155, indicates that his theory was
also that the legislature had succeeded to the power of the equity courts to superintend
charitable trusts.
9. Cary Library v. Bliss, 151 Mass. 364, 25 N.E. 92 (1890).
10. Adams v. Plunkett, 274 Mass. 453, 175 N.E. 60 (1931).
11. Goldstein v. Trustees of Sailors' Snug Harbor, 277 App. Div. 269, 98 N.Y.S.2d
544 (1st Dep't 1950).
12. Opinion of the Justices, 237 Mass. 613, 131 N.E. 31 (1921).
13. See notes 9 and 10 supra. In these cases a contract between the settlor and
beneficiaries was based on the acceptance of the completed gift by the beneficiaries
in enacting required rules and regulations. No such acts of acceptance were present
in the instant case which. could give rise to so clear a contract In addition, it is
doubtful whether the defaulting purchaser in the instant case, who was not a party
to the contract that arose between the state and the trustees from the plaintiff-
trustees' incorporation, could raise the issue of impairment as was done by the cor-
porate trustees in the Sailors' Snug Harbor case, note 11 supra, because of their
apparent lack of standing. Cf. Williams v. Eggleston, 170 U.S. 304, 309 (1898);
Hagar v. Reclamation District No. 108, 111 U.S. 701, 712 (1884); Brown v. Gilpin,
75 Kan. 773, 90 Pac. 267 (1907) ; Phinney v. Trustees of Sheppard & Enoch Pratt
Hospital, 88 Md. 633, 42 At. 58 (1898).
14. 3 Scott, TRuSTS § 399 ef seq. (1939).
15. 3 id. § 399.1.
16. Ibid. The difficulty with such power was that the King was not required
to adhere to the settlor's purpose. The courts, however, exercise it only to carry
out the testator's probable intention.
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prerogative cy pres doctrine; but, they do raise the related question of
whether the legislature should even have the power to authorize deviations
in trust terms only, in view of the fundamental doctrine of separation of
powers.17 and the fact that this power has so long been exercised by courts
of equity.18 The advent of administrative agencies in the last twenty years
has seen the largest breakdown in the application of the separation of
powers doctrine. This withdrawal from strict adherence to the doctrine by
giving such agencies many legislative and judicial characteristics was based
on, and supported by, the necessity of accomplishing otherwise impossible
goals speedily and efficiently. Nothing less than a similar necessity 19
should be tolerated as the basis for further withdrawals. 4 In situations
similar to the instant one, it is doubtful if many attempts will be made to
gain legislative permission to deviate from the terms of the trust when
judicial authorization, with its advantages of time and effort, is available.
However, it is conceivable that if judicial authorization were sought and
denied, legislative authorization might be granted. The legislature is thus
in a position to abrogate seriously the power of the equity courts in this
area. This result is not only undesirable on the basis of the theory of sepa-
ration of powers,21 but also because the legislature is less qualified to super-
vise the area. The chancellor will see to it that the trust is properly ad-
ministered, that the purpose of the donor is not thwarted, and that the
interests of the beneficiaries are subserved.2 2  Moreover, the expertise that
undoubtedly has developed in judges accustomed to operating on the basis
of conscience, discretion, and historical precedents, plus the advantages of
an adversary type litigation, seem to make the courts better qualified to
determine the advisability of deviations in trust terms than the legislatures
whose members have little experience in the area and are subject to greater
outside pressures, and whose committee rules give no assurance that all
interested parties will have notice and an opportunity to be heard.
17. For the origin and development of the theory of separation of powers, see
MoNTEsQuIEu, SPRrT oF LAWS, Book 11, c. 6 (Nugent ed. 1873).
18. See note 5 supra.
19. It should be noted that the necessity resulting from a change in economic
conditions which warrants change in the trust terms is not the necessity which should
be required before the legislature can act in an area that is historically and adminis-
tratively judicial. This latter necessity would only result from some judicial inability
to continue to administer the area.
20. Although not adopting this writer's view that the -doctrine of separation of
powers should be enforced to its maximum limit, James Madison said, ". . . it is
against the enterprising ambition of this department [legislative], that the people
ought to indulge all their jealousy, and exhaust all their precautions." THE FED-
ERALsT, No. 48 at 274 (Scott ed. 1894).
21. Professor Scott also takes the position that "it would seem to be more in
accordance with the general principles of our law to hold that the legislature has no
such power. . . ." 3 Scorr, TRusTs § 399.5 (1939).
22. Bridgeport Public Library v. Burroughs Home, 85 Conn. 309. 82 Atl. 582
(1912).
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